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Epistemic and Non-epistemic Aspects of the
Factfinding Process in Law [1]
Vern R. Walker, J.D.*

* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law

Legislators, regulators, and judges attempt to create factfinding processes that integrate
both epistemic and non-epistemic goals. Moreover, the rule of law requires that those
factfinding processes be principled, equitable, and reasonably transparent. This
complex endeavor therefore produces some of the best-documented examples of
societal factfinding. This essay analyzes the major decisional elements in such
factfinding processes, with attention to common sub-tasks, distinct decision makers,
and points of divergence for institutional procedures and safeguards.
The fundamental point of this essay is that any factfinding process in a governmental
institution is designed to balance the epistemic objective against relevant non-epistemic
objectives. The epistemic objective is to produce findings of fact that are as accurate as
possible and that are warranted by the evidence legally available to the factfinder. The
non-epistemic objectives include many that are common across governmental
institutions (such as procedural fairness to parties and administrative efficiency), as well
as many that vary by institution and by area of law (such as public health, safety in the
space shuttle program, low inflation, protection of labor unions, and corrective justice).
The background hypothesis, which is not argued in the essay, is that all truth-seeking
processes of human beings exhibit a similar blending of epistemic and non-epistemic
aspects, although few collective factfinding endeavors are as carefully engineered as
the factfinding processes in law.[2]
Factfinding in law is always pragmatic, in the sense that it always occurs in a context in
which governmental action is at stake. First, the range of possible actions that any
particular governmental institution is empowered to take is usually well settled. Such an
action might be issuing a final regulation, sentencing someone to prison, ordering
compensation or payment of a fine, issuing a report, or making recommendations.
Furthermore, the positive substantive law generally identifies which findings of fact are
required in order to justify particular actions. For example, statutes and implementing
rules identify the factual issues that the Environmental Protection Agency must establish
before that agency can lawfully suspend or cancel an existing approval (“registration”) of
a pesticide that leaves a residue in food.[3] Judicial precedents establish the factual
elements that a torts plaintiff must prove before the court can lawfully order a defendant
to pay compensation. Legislative bodies, regulatory agencies engaged in rulemaking,
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and courts applying common law decide which factual predicates justify which actions,
and then those engaged in adjudication or enforcement know which factual findings are
legally significant. The propositions at issue in any given proceeding determine the
relevance of any evidence submitted for the record in that proceeding.
The epistemic objective in factfinding is to ensure that the factfinder will be accurate in
declaring (“finding”) propositions to be true for purposes of the legal proceeding, and
that the evidence that is legally available warrants or adequately supports those findings
of fact. But the factfinding process cannot be divorced from the pragmatic context in
which it occurs, and which justifies expending resources on the factfinding process. The
non-epistemic objectives therefore influence what evidence is ruled to be “legally
available,” when the factfinder should be allowed to find that the available evidence
“adequately supports” a finding, what standard of proof the factfinder should use in
selecting a finding, what kinds and levels of uncertainty are acceptable in factfinding,
and so forth. Rules governing such decisions should always balance substantive
policies, procedural fairness, and administrative efficiency against the epistemic
objective. Some non-epistemic policies trump the epistemic objective (for example, the
minimal demands of due process), while others only weigh in the balance, or only apply
when the epistemic objective is unachievable. This essay will discuss a few of the major
decisional nodes in judicial and administrative factfinding.
It is important at the outset to clarify the phrases “issue of fact” and “issue of law.”
These are terms of art that indicate who the decider is, rather than the nature of what is
to be decided. “Issues of fact” present decisions for the factfinder – which in a given
proceeding may be a jury, a judge, an administrative hearing examiner, or a regulator.
The factfinder is supervised in each case by a presiding judge or other official. “Issues
of law” are decided in the first instance by the judge or regulatory official who presides
over the factfinding proceeding, with an appropriate opportunity for further review.
Further review of issues of law is almost always available, and incorporates various
degrees of deference to the presiding judge’s or official’s ruling. In this essay, the
neutral phrase “proposition at issue” refers to the content of a contested issue, which
might be decided in a particular case through a finding by the factfinder (as an issue of
fact) or through a ruling by the presiding or reviewing authority (as an issue of law).
Participants in a legal proceeding can usually examine the applicable law and agree at
an early stage on the list of propositions at issue. The entire process in which various
decision makers resolve those issues, for the pragmatic purposes of the relevant legal
context, is the factfinding process.
The remainder of this essay examines the structure of the factfinding process by
discussing three major decisional roles, which I will call the province of the factfinder,
the province of the presiding authority, and the province of the reviewing authority.

The Province of the Factfinder
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The province of the factfinder has as its main task the evaluation of all the evidence
produced and the declaration of which propositions will constitute the findings of the
proceeding (called “verdicts” in the case of jury findings). In one sense, the factfinder
makes these decisions with considerable freedom, and there is little “law” about how to
accomplish this task. There are few if any rules about how to assess the credibility of a
fact witness’s testimony, how much probative value to assign to a document or to an
expert’s theory, or how to integrate (for example) the mathematical probabilities derived
from DNA evidence with the likelihood that the investigating police department
contaminated or planted that DNA evidence. But to say that there is little law about how
the factfinder should reach decisions within the zone of factfinding discretion is largely a
truism, if by “law” is meant decisional rules adopted by presiding and reviewing
authorities. Such rules do channel the factfinder’s decisions, but those rules operate
outside the province of the factfinder, and therefore outside the zone of factfinding
discretion. The process of factfinding is a dynamic interaction between factfinder
decision-making and constraining rules, with the general trend in many areas of law
being in the direction of adding more constraining rules.
Probably the largest category of constraining rules consists of substantive rules of law,
although such rules are not always recognized as constraints on the factfinder.
Consider a torts case in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant acted negligently.
A basic proposition at issue (and presumptively for the jury) is whether the defendant
engaged in any conduct that is considered negligent. There are many judicial rules,
however, that create necessary conditions under this factual issue. For example, many
courts hold that unless the defendant knew or reasonably should have known about the
risks created by a course of conduct, then the defendant could not have been negligent
in engaging in that conduct.[4] This rule therefore generates a disjunctive proposition
about whether the defendant had “notice” (“knew or should have known”), which any
plaintiff is required to prove in order to establish that negligence occurred. Substantive
judicial rules can therefore generate new propositional issues to be resolved by the
factfinder, yet at the same time impose new constraints on the discretion of the
factfinder.
Another category of constraining rules, closely related to substantive rules, consists of
definitional rules. In a civil or criminal trial, for example, the presiding judge instructs the
jury concerning the issues of fact about which the jury must make findings. The
presiding judge leaves undefined most of the words employed in those instructions, for
definitions always lead to more words, and defining must end somewhere. The
meanings of most words, therefore, are left to the factfinder to determine, on the basis
of the factfinder’s background knowledge. With respect to certain critical terms,
however, courts may adopt rules of definition. Using the example of negligence in tort
law, judges routinely tell juries that the law defines “negligence” as “lack of ordinary
care” and “a failure to use that degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would
have used under the same circumstances.”[5] The judge, however, probably will not
define further such terms as “ordinary,” “degree of care,” and “prudent.” Taken together,
the substantive rules and definitional rules identify for the factfinder those propositions
that need to be resolved. And at the same time those rules place boundaries on the
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factfinder’s role, and to some extent may influence the factfinder’s decisions within
those boundaries.
A third category of constraining rules addresses process aspects of the factfinder’s task.
Chief among these are rules concerning the standard of proof and burden of persuasion
that the factfinder is to employ. For every issue of fact to be decided, there is a standard
of proof to be met before a finding should be made. Standards of proof describe for the
factfinder the quality of support required between the available evidence and the finding.
For most issues in civil cases, the standard of proof is a “preponderance of the
evidence”: the factfinder is to make a finding thatp if, but only if, the evidence supports p
more than it supports p’s negation, not-p.[6] For some issues of fact, the law imposes a
“clear-and-convincing-evidence” standard of proof, while criminal cases employ the
familiar “beyond-a-reasonable-doubt” standard of proof.[7] In contrast to the standard of
proof, the burden of persuasion instructs the factfinder as to which party loses if the
evidence does not satisfy the standard of proof. For example, if an issue of fact is to be
decided by a preponderance of the evidence, but the relevant evidence in the case is
equally weighted as between p and not-p, then, if the plaintiff has the burden of
persuasion on p, the jury must find not-p, against the plaintiff. Typically, rules of law
allocate the burden of persuasion to some particular party, for every factual issue in the
case.
A fourth category of constraining rule on factfinders consists of default inference rules.
For example, a legal presumption is a rule of law that describes what inference the
factfinder either must or may draw, once the factfinder finds some specified proposition
to be true. An example is the presumption that a person missing for some fixed period
of time is dead, absent evidence to the contrary.[8] Presumptions may be either
mandatory (“If you (the factfinder) find p to be true, then you must find q to be true”) or
permissive (“If you find p to be true, then you may find q to be true”).
Yet a fifth category of constraining rules consists of relevant-factor rules – rules of law
that prescribe which factors the factfinder either must or may consider in arriving at a
finding. For example, in determining whether the conduct of an actor was negligent, the
factfinder should take into account the magnitude of the risk involved and the utility of
the act or of the manner in which the act was done.[9]
There are undoubtedly additional types of rules that constrain factfinder discretion, but
the categories mentioned above supply enough examples to illustrate the following
point. Substantive rules of law, legal definitions, process rules, presumptions, and
relevant-factor rules are all devices to structure the factfinder’s role in deciding the
propositions at issue. Some rules provide the grounds for taking a propositional issue
away from the factfinder altogether (as discussed in the next section). Some are best
understood as explicit or implicit commands (“… you must …”) or permissions (“… you
may …”) addressed to the factfinder. There is of course no guarantee that the factfinder
will understand those instructions, let alone follow them. The surest safeguard, other
than the good-faith efforts of the factfinder, is the system of oversight provided by the
presiding and reviewing authorities. As discussed below, those authorities are additional
40

decision makers, whose provinces of decision interact with the province of the factfinder
in complicated ways.

The Province of the Presiding Authority
In a judicial proceeding, the presiding authority is a trial judge. In an administrative
adjudication, it may an administrative law judge or a hearing examiner. In an
administrative rulemaking, it is the presiding regulatory official, who may chair a
commission or a board. In any case, the presiding authority is the decision maker who
presides over the creation of the official evidentiary record and who oversees the
participation of the factfinder. The presiding authority also decides in the first instance
which legal rules are applicable in the particular proceeding, and decides whether and
how to enforce the applicable legal rules. This may involve instructing the factfinder
about the legal rules as it is appropriate to do so, or granting or denying the motions of
participating parties.
In many factfinding proceedings, a single individual functions as both the factfinder and
the presiding authority. In judicial proceedings, examples are “bench trials” (in which the
judge hears and decides the case without a jury) and hearings on preliminary matters
(such as hearings on motions to exclude expert testimony).[10] In administrative
adjudications, the administrative law judge generally decides the case without a jury. In
all of these proceedings, however, the distinction between the functions of factfinder
and presider is still vitally important. When the judge in a bench trial makes a finding as
the factfinder, her decision is entitled to the deference due to any factfinder’s decision.
When that same judge makes a ruling as a matter of law, however, her ruling is subject
to the same scope of appellate review as any trial judge’s ruling on an issue of law. The
fact that the same person often plays two roles does not cause the line between those
roles to vanish. This duality of role is possible in large part because the reviewing
authority enforces the distinction between issues of fact and issues of law. The different
scopes of appellate review for issues of fact and issues of law are discussed below,
under the province of the reviewing authority.
Because the presiding authority decides all issues of law in the first instance (subject to
appellate review), he or she can make rulings on every category of legal issue that was
discussed above under the province of the factfinder. On the motions and arguments of
participating parties, and occasionally sua sponte, a presiding authority will decide
which substantive rules of law, definitional rules, process rules, default inference rules,
and relevant-factor rules are in force within the jurisdiction and applicable in the
proceeding. Even in proceedings where the same person acts as both factfinder and
presiding official, a party may move for rulings of law concerning propositional issues on
which the same judge will ultimately make findings of fact. Just as in a jury trial, such
rulings on issues of law may constrain the judge’s discretion as factfinder.
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In addition to these types of rulings, a presiding authority must decide important issues
of law concerning the evidence proffered by the parties. Some evidentiary rules are
process rules –such as the rules governing the discovery of evidence (e.g., rules
governing the taking of depositions, the production of documents, and the conduct of
physical examinations).[11] Other evidentiary rules are exclusionary rules, concerning
which proffered items of evidence are inadmissible in the proceeding. A judicial example
is Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which states the conditions under which expert
testimony may be admitted in federal courts, and which the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreted in its decision in Daubert.[12] In deciding whether to admit an expert’s
opinion that (for example) the plaintiff’s exposure in utero to a certain drug caused the
plaintiff’s injury, a federal trial judge must first decide whether the empirical and
theoretical basis for that opinion is sufficiently “reliable” and “relevant” to the case at
hand, and may decide whether its probative value is “substantially outweighed” by the
risk of misleading the factfinder.[13] If the trial judge decides to exclude the testimony,
then the jury will not hear that opinion and the judge as factfinder may not rely on it as
evidence. In administrative proceedings, the rules governing discovery and admissibility
of evidence generally are quite different than those in judicial proceedings. These
differences are often due to differences in institutional structure and in the blend of
epistemic and non-epistemic goals.
Another important type of ruling on evidence assesses (as a matter of law) the “legal
sufficiency” of the totality of admissible evidence introduced into the case, and allocates
to particular parties the burden of producing that evidence. On every proposition at
issue in a judicial proceeding, there is a rule of law assigning to some party the burden
of producing evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to find the issue in that
party’s favor.[14] The party that has the burden of producing or coming forward with
evidence (for short, the “burden of production”) must lose the contest over the
proposition if that party fails to produce enough evidence – in the form of real evidence,
documents, and testimony. The totality of admitted evidence that is relevant to any
proposition at issue must meet minimal sufficiency requirements before the presiding
judge will present the proposition to the factfinder. Rulings on sufficiency create
therefore a threshold of reasonableness before the exercise of the factfinder’s
discretion. For example, in a tort complaint alleging that the defendant negligently
caused the plaintiff’s injury, the plaintiff has the burden of production on a number of
propositions, including the propositions that the defendant in fact engaged in negligent
conduct and that the defendant’s negligence in fact caused the plaintiff to suffer some
injury. If the plaintiff fails to produce what the courts consider legally sufficient evidence
to support findings for the plaintiff on these issues, then the trial judge should decide
those issues against the plaintiff “as a matter of law.” Although this example is from a
judicial proceeding, administrative adjudications may have similar rules about
sufficiency.
In judicial civil cases, parties can raise the issue of the legal sufficiency of the evidence
at various times, through a number of different motions. First, a party can obtain such a
ruling in a motion for summary judgment, before the trial begins.[15] Second, a moving
party can obtain a ruling at trial, after the non-moving party has had an opportunity to
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produce the evidence. The issue may be raised then by a motion for directed verdict or
for judgment as a matter of law.[16] Third, the motion can be renewed if the factfinder
reaches an unfavorable finding, in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or
a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.[17] Each motion, brought at a
different time in the proceeding, may require the moving party to establish slightly
different factual predicates, but the essence of the argument is the same: that as a
matter of law the non-moving party will fail, or has failed, to satisfy its burden of
producing evidence that the law considers minimally sufficient.
It is also possible for a court to decide an issue as a matter of law for the party who has
the burden of production, if the party successfully argues that the evidence produced is
so overwhelming that any reasonable jury would have to find for that party. It is far more
common, however, for a court to enter judgment as a matter of law against the party
with the burden of production, because of a deficiency in the evidence. This is primarily
because it is easier to devise and apply rules of law about when evidence is missing or
deficient, than about when produced evidence compels an inference.

The Province of the Reviewing Authority
Just as the presiding authority oversees the work of the factfinder, the reviewing
authority oversees the work of the presiding authority. In the case of judicial
proceedings, the reviewing authority is an appellate court.[18] In the case of an
administrative proceeding, the reviewing authority may be either an administrative body
or a court conducting judicial review of the final administrative action. The general rules
governing the relative authority of the reviewer over the decisions of the presider are
called the “scope” or standard of review.
When it comes to reviewing issues of fact, the reviewing authority is required by law to
be extremely deferential. When the factfinder is a jury, strictly speaking the appellate
court does not review the verdict directly. Rather, any challenge to a jury verdict
generally must arise first as a motion to the trial judge, and then any appeal challenges
the trial judge’s ruling on that motion. This is not a matter of mere semantics. The scope
of review that is due to the trial court’s ruling depends upon the nature of the motion
made to the trial judge – which may be reviewed for “abuse of discretion” or reviewed
“de novo,” as discussed below.
Direct appellate review of a finding of fact does occur when the presiding authority is
also the factfinder. For example, in civil bench trials in federal court, the trial judge must
make findings of fact on the basis of the evidentiary record.[19] Appellate review of
those findings of fact uses the “clearly erroneous” standard.[20] That is, the appellate
court is not permitted to substitute its own assessment of the evidence for that of the
trier of fact, so long as it is not clear that the trier of fact has committed a mistake.[21]

43

Judicial review of administrative factfinding is similarly deferential. In general, the
reviewing court must respect the findings of fact of the administrative agency unless
those findings are “arbitrary [or] capricious” or “unsupported by substantial evidence” in
the record.[22] In practice, these two standards may come to much the same thing.[23]
The scope or standard of review for many other rulings of the presider is the “abuse-ofdiscretion” standard, which is also very deferential. As long as the presiding authority’s
ruling is not “manifestly erroneous,” the reviewing authority has the obligation to let the
ruling stand. Often the type of ruling at issue involves the appropriateness of applying a
correctly stated rule of law to the particular circumstances of a specific case, and the
reviewing authority, which does not observe those circumstances first-hand, is not the
best decider. Abuse-of-discretion review is applicable, for example, to trial court
decisions to exclude proffered evidence because it is potentially prejudicial or
needlessly cumulative.[24]
Not all abuse-of-discretion review, however, can be justified on the rationale that the
presider is in a better position to assess the circumstances than the reviewer is. The
abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to federal trial court rulings to exclude
expert testimony for failure to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702.[25] In Daubert
matters, however, appellate courts are often in as good a position as the trial court to
decide questions about the reliability and relevance of proffered scientific testimony. In
such situations, a more complicated justification, in terms of non-epistemic as well as
epistemic policies, would be needed to justify abuse-of-discretion review instead of de
novo review. Arguing the merits of such a justification, however, must remain beyond
the scope of this essay.
With respect to “pure” issues of law, appellate review of trial court decisions or judicial
review of administrative decisions is generally “de novo”: that is, the presiding
authority’s rulings are subject to review without any deference to the presiding
authority’s ruling.[26] If the presiding authority stated a rule of law incorrectly, or applied
it in such a way that it is clear that the presiding authority misunderstood the law, then
the reviewing authority simply reverses such a ruling and orders an appropriate remedy
(which may include sending the case back to the trial court for re-trial or remanding the
matter to the administrative agency). An example is a ruling that the evidence produced
by a party who has the burden of production is legally insufficient. The argument that a
party has failed to meet its burden of production raises an issue of law on which the
moving party is entitled to de novo review by the appellate court. One justification for
this in a judicial setting is that otherwise a trial judge would have undue power to
deprive a plaintiff of her right to a trial by jury. A broader justification is to enable
appellate courts to create rules about minimal sufficiency of evidence that they can then
enforce uniformly across all trial courts in the jurisdiction.
In general, therefore, reviewing authorities do not have the power to make decisions
that are reserved to factfinders, and have precisely defined powers to set aside
decisions made by presiding officers. Unless a proposition at issue can be resolved as a
matter of law, if an appellate court decides to disregard a verdict or finding that is
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essential to the case, then the case must be sent back to the trial court to be re-tried.
Similarly, a reviewing authority generally does not have the power to make
administrative decisions, in the place of the agency. If the reviewing court vacates an
administrative agency’s action because it was arbitrary or capricious, then the matter
must be remanded to the agency for further action.

Conclusion
Factfinding in a legal context is a highly structured process in which there are distinct
decision-making roles. Each of the three principal roles (factfinder, presiding authority,
and reviewing authority) has a significant zone of discretion in which to operate, yet
decisions within that zone are constrained by decisions within the other two provinces.
The factfinder’s zone of discretion centers on making findings about issues of fact, but
rules of law often take propositional issues away from the factfinder and give them to
the presiding or reviewing authority. The reviewing authority enjoys the greatest
discretion in deciding what the rules of law are, but this discretion is constrained by
rules identifying issues of fact reserved for the factfinder to decide. Of course, the
discretion of the reviewing authority is also constrained by the legislature (through
statutes), by administrative rulemaking, and by higher reviewing authority. Between the
factfinder and the reviewing authority lies the zone of discretion of the presiding
authority, which is least constrained in decisions about how to apply the established
legal rules to the particular circumstances of the individual case.
The strategy behind factfinding in law is not so much to establish a methodology or
logical model of inference to use in assessing the quality of factfinding outcomes, but
rather to maintain a dynamic process of rule-governed decision-making, through which
(it is hoped) reasonable decision makers will come close enough to achieving the
epistemic objective over time. In deciding either to establish or to apply each of these
rules, there is a persistent need to balance epistemic and non-epistemic aspects of the
factfinding process, so that the process adequately serves its pragmatic function within
the governmental institution. There is a great deal of theoretical work to be done in
deciding the proper balance for each type of decision, by each type of decision maker,
and for each type of propositional issue.

[1] This article was originally published in APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law, Fall
2003. Professor Walker wishes to acknowledge the research support of Hofstra
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